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Since 2004, China has been backed into a situation where the renminbi is expected to go ever 
higher against the dollar, and this one-way bet has led to a loss of domestic monetary control. 
Combined with a more general flight from the U.S. dollar, the resulting monetary explosion in 
China contributes to the worldwide increase in primary commodity prices—with excess 
liquidity reminiscent of the global inflation generated by the weak dollar in the 1970s. 
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1. Introduction 
Because China’s trade surplus (net saving surplus) has spiraled up rapidly since 2000, its 
overall current-account surplus reached $360 billion in 2007. This covers almost half of 
the much larger U.S current-account deficit of $750 billion—and if recent trends continue 
could cover more than half. Of course, this trade imbalance can only be corrected in the 
longer term if China’s net saving—i.e., saving minus investment—falls, and the inverse 
occurs in the United States (the silver lining in the housing crisis?).  
But, in the near term, China faces a financial conundrum. Because of political 
pressure from the United States, since July 21, 2005 the renminbi’s peg to the dollar has 
crawled steadily upward at about 6 percent per year, and this rate of appreciation is 
expected to continue or even accelerate. Because of this one-way bet in the foreign 
exchange markets, since 2004 more than 100 percent of China’s huge current account 
surplus has been financed by building up official exchange reserves. 
Clearly, China with its ever-rising official exchange reserves contrasts sharply 
with other large surplus-saving countries such as Germany and Japan, whose surpluses on 
current account are matched by private short-term and long-term capital outflows. Could 
foreign exchange restrictions be the problem? By 2007, China had effectively eliminated 
foreign exchange controls on capital outflows by industrial corporations and financial 
institutions, while individuals have generous allowances for foreign travel. Although now 
free to diversify by investing outside of the country, the private (non state) sector refuses 
to do so. On the contrary, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is 
still struggling, somewhat vainly, to restrict the deluge of “hot” money inflows.  
What is behind this abnormality? Because all participants in the foreign exchange 
markets now expect that the renminbi will continue appreciating against the dollar, they 
are reluctant to hold dollar assets. This reluctance is accentuated even more when 
American interest rates are abnormally low, as they now are with the U.S. Federal Funds 
rate at just 2 percent. So at this juncture in international finance, we distinguish between 
two meanings of the concept of “global imbalance”. First, the great saving imbalances 
across countries that are reflected in the large trade (saving) deficit of the United States 
and large trade (saving) surpluses of China, Japan, Germany, oil exporters, and a host of 
smaller countries. Second, the further massive imbalance in financial intermediation for 3 
China’s huge current account surplus with the United States. Instead of a “normal” 
outflow of private capital to finance China’s trade surplus, China’s central bank 
accumulates vast amounts of foreign exchange—some of which is invested in U.S. 
treasury bonds. 
  Of the two types of global imbalance, saving-investment imbalance across 
countries is at once the best known and most intractable in the short run. For 2007, figure 
1 shows the huge net current account surplus of China amounting to over 10 percent of its 
GDP, and the large current account deficit of the United States of about 5 percent of its 
much larger GDP necessitating borrowing elsewhere around the world as well. However, 
re-balancing by reducing excess saving in the large creditor countries while increasing 
net saving in the United States is certainly possible in the longer run. And this 
international rebalancing can (best) be done without changing nominal exchange rates 
(McKinnon 2007a). Although very important, this global re-balancing of net saving 
propensities is intractable without being preceded by currency stabilization.  
 

































Consequently, we initially focus on the sub-problem of unbalanced international financial 
intermediation and loss of monetary control in China. Because of the one-way bet on 
renminbi appreciation as aggravated by the extraordinary cuts in U. S. interest rates since 
August 2007, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has had to intervene massively to buy 
dollars with domestic base money. However, to better understand China’s current 
monetary impasse, we first consider a brief history of China’s foreign exchange policies 
since its market-oriented liberalization began in 1979.  
 
2. Three Phases of the Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate   
At the risk of over simplifying, Figure 2 partitions the evolution of China’s exchange rate 
regime into three phases: currency inconvertibility and exchange depreciation before 
1994, the fixed dollar exchange rate from 1995 to 21 July 2005, and the subsequent 
appreciation by a predictable upward crawl through mid 2008:  































a.  Phase 1  
 
Before 1994, China’s currency was inconvertible in the strong sense of the word. There 
were multiple exchange rates (an official rate and floating swap rates for new exports of 
manufactures in different parts of the country), exchange controls on both current and 
capital account transactions, and both exports and imports had to be funneled through 
state trading companies. Throughout the 1980s, this so-called “airlock system” insulated 
domestic relative prices still influenced by central planning from those prevailing on 
world markets—except for a few fledgling Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on the East 
Coast.  
So without free arbitrage between domestic and foreign prices, how the official 
exchange rate was set was arbitrary. Figure 2 shows only the official exchange rate’s path 
from only 1.5 yuan per dollar back in 1979 and increased (devalued) in steps to 5.8 yuan 
per dollar by the end of 1993. However, the incentives for exporting or importing were 
not much affected—nor was the domestic price level. And tight exchange controls 
prevented “hot” money flows. The official rate was not economically very meaningful.  
 
b.  Phase 2 
 
1994 was China’s banner year for sweeping financial reforms both in domestic taxation 
and in the organization of foreign trade. The Chinese authorities abolished exchange 
controls on current-account transactions (exporting, importing, interest and dividends) 
and unified the exchange rate. Separate and more favorable exchange rates for 
manufactured exports were abolished. By 1996, China had formally satisfied the 
International Monetary Fund’s Article VIII on current account convertibility.  
The new consolidated official rate was set at 8.7 yuan per dollar in 1994, which 
was closer to the average of the previous swaps rates. True, this represented a substantial 
devaluation of the official rate from 5.8 yuan per dollar, but the period 1993-95 was a 
period of high inflation in China. Figure 3 shows that the nominal depreciation of the 
official rate was about the same order of magnitude of the excess of China’s inflation 
over that prevailing in the United States (as much as 20 percent in 1994). With the 
currency unification, real depreciation—if any—was minimal. 6 
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By 1995, the nominal exchange rate had settled down to about 8.28 yuan per dollar and 
was held there for 10 years—our Phase 2. The main motivations for so fixing the 
exchange rate were two fold. First, in the previous phase of currency inconvertibility 
going back to 1979 when liberalization began, China had suffered from a “roller coaster” 
ride in the rate of real output growth and in inflation rates—peaking out with the high 
inflation of 1993-95 (Figure 4). With only an embryonic domestic capital market and 
with the progressive relaxation of central planning and direct price controls, the PBC had 
great trouble anchoring the overall price level by domestic means alone. Thus the 
unification of the exchange rate regime in 1994, and move to full current account 
convertibility 1994-96, presented an opportunity to adopt a more stable external nominal 
anchor. And Figure 4 shows that, as the exchange rate remained fixed at 8.28 yuan/dollar 
until 21 July 2005, cycles of inflation and real output growth in China were smoothed—
while inflation came down to the American level by 2004.  
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Indeed, in the great Asian crisis of 1997-98, sharp devaluations by neighboring 
countries—not only the well known crisis five
1, but also by Japan, Taiwan, and 
Singapore— imposed strong deflationary pressure on China. But Premier Zhu Rongji 
wisely ignored advice to let the renminbi become more “flexible” and depreciate in 
tandem. Instead, he held on to the fixed exchange rate anchor and engaged in a great “one 
trillion” dollar fiscal expansion, largely infrastructure investments, over the next four 
years. In the crisis, China’s exchange rate and fiscal policies saved the East Asian 
economy from further imploding—and allowed the neighboring countries to recover 
more quickly. China’s policy of fixing the nominal exchange rate at 8.28/dollar, within a 
narrow band of ± .3 percent for daily fluctuations, gained credibility. 
 
                                                            































1990 82.0  638.7  12.8%  41.5  147.6  28.1% 
1991 140.0  793.1  17.6%  57.9  154.4  37.5% 
1992 133.0  922.8  14.4%  -6.9  129.7  -5.3% 
1993 155.0  1314.7  11.8%  21.9  391.9  5.6% 
1994 445.1  1721.8  25.9%  290.2  407.1  71.3% 
1995 667.0  2076.0  32.1%  221.8  354.2  62.6% 
1996 956.2  2688.9  35.6%  289.3  612.9  47.2% 
1997 1345.2  3063.3  43.9%  389.0  374.4  103.9% 
1998 1376.2  3133.5  43.9%  31.0  70.3  44.1% 
1999 1485.8  3362.0  44.2%  109.6  228.5  48.0% 
2000 1558.3  3649.2  42.7%  72.5  287.2  25.3% 
2001 1986.0  3985.2  49.8%  427.8  336.0  127.3% 
2002 2324.3  4513.8  51.5%  338.3  528.7  64.0% 
2003 3114.2  5284.1  58.9%  789.9  770.3  102.5% 
2004 4696.0  5885.6  79.8%  1581.8  601.5  263.0% 
2005 6344.0  6434.3  98.6%  1648.0  548.7  300.3% 
2006 8577.3  7775.8  110.3%  2233.3  1341.5  166.5% 
2007 12217.1  9243.3  132.2%  3639.8  1467.5  248.0% 
Source: IMF, OECD. Billion CNY. 
 
In Phase 2, the fixed exchange rate’s success as an anchor for China’s price level was as 
much a guideline for domestic monetary policy as an instrument. True, continual PBC 
purchases of foreign exchange, modest by today’s standards, were the main instrument 
for increasing the monetary base. However, before 2004 when the renminbi was not 
expected to appreciate, these purchases generally amounted to less than 100 percent of 
the growth in base money (Table 1). Thus substantial sterilization operations were not 
necessary. In this fixed rate period, the rapid increase in the demand for base money from 
China’s very high GDP growth, coupled with an income elasticity of money demand 
greater than one, more or less balanced the rapid increase in money supply.  
However, the monetary control mechanism was not only the exchange-rate itself. 
To prevent overheating, there remained a panoply of supporting direct controls over bank 
credit— including reserve requirements, credit quotas, lending restrictions by sector, and 9 
so on. But for controlling inflation, the renminbi’s exchange rate against the dollar was 
the effective intermediate target  
Why didn’t China rely more heavily on domestic financial indicators? With rapid 
financial transformation and very high saving, the velocity of money—whether defined 
by M1, M2, or M3— was (is) too unpredictable for any monetary aggregate to be useful 
as an intermediate target. And the velocity of money, defined as GDP/M, becomes even 
more difficult to predict when nominal GDP itself is subject to large revisions. Indeed, 
nominal GDP was revised sharply upward in 2006. Although Figure 5 shows that M2 still 
grew much faster than nominal GDP, the authorities could have no firm idea of what was 
“too fast” and thus inflationary.  
 


























Source: OECD, WEO. 
Still, couldn’t the Chinese monetary authorities target inflation more directly? The 
absence of a well developed domestic bond market, and presence of rigid interest rate 
pegs for bank deposits and loans, militated against using conventional open-market 
operations to target some key internal interest rate—as per the Taylor Rule—to control 10 
the macro economy as in the United States or euro area. The “New Keynesian” Taylor 
Rule itself presumes that the authorities have fairly accurate information on the ebb and 
flow of excess capacity over the business cycle, which could not be the case in China’s 
era of extremely high— but somewhat unpredictable real—economic growth. Thus, the 
fixed dollar exchange rate was the preferred intermediate monetary target for stabilizing 
the price level. In Japan’s similar era of extraordinary real economic growth and financial 
change from 1949 to 1971, the domestic price level was safely anchored by pegging the 
yen at 360 to the dollar (McKinnon and Ohno, 1997).  
To summarize Phase 2, the 10-year fix at 8.28 yuan per dollar was seen as a way 
of implementing monetary policy, made possible by the currency unification in 1994 and 
the move to current account convertibility in 1994-96. It was very successful in anchoring 
the domestic price level through 2004 (Figure 3) and smoothing fluctuations in real 
economic growth (Figure 4). Contrary to what is often alleged
2, the fixed exchange rate 
was not a device to cunningly “undervalue” the renminbi so as to create a mercantile 
advantage by artificially stimulating exports. 
 
c.  Phase 3 
 
What then pushed China off its fixed-rate anchor on July 21, 2005?  
First, after 2003, unexpected current account surpluses, coupled with large inflows of 
foreign direct investment led to balance of payments surpluses. Figure 1 shows the 
sudden spurt in China’s multilateral current account surplus from 2 percent of GDP in 
2003 to more than 10 percent in 2007. (In Japan’s high growth era of the 1950s and 60s 
under a fixed exchange rate, significant inflows of FDI had been prohibited and domestic 
saving and investment were in better balance.) And the U.S. was the recipient of much of 
China’s surge in manufactured exports. China’s bilateral trade surplus with the United 
States (Figure 6), reached 1.1 % of America’s GDP in 2006—twice as large as Japan’s. 
The loss of jobs in U.S. manufacturing disturbed American politicians. 
                                                            
2   See, for example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004 for misinterpreting China’s fixed exchange 
rate, and those of smaller Asian countries, as a more or less deliberate attempt to undervalue their 
currencies. 11 
Figure 6: Bilateral Trade Balances of Japan and China versus the U.S. (percent of 
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Second, China’s balance of payments surpluses were misinterpreted by economists and 
politicians everywhere as an exchange rate problem, i.e., the renminbi was artificially 
“undervalued”. And the more rapid build-up of official exchange reserves in 2003-5 
(Table 1), was taken as per se evidence of unfair currency manipulation. Whence the 
American political pressure on China to begin appreciating the renminbi: our Phase 3. 
Led by Senators Charles Schumer of New York and Leslie Graham of North Carolina, 
the U.S. government threatened to sanction China by imposing import tariffs unless it 
appreciated. And on July 21, 2005 it appreciated discretely by 2.5 percent, and 
subsequently has been appreciating by about 6 percent per year with the disruptive effects 
on international capital flows discussed above. 
The expectation of further appreciation of the renminbi coupled with the sharp fall 
in U.S. interest rates, the Federal Funds rate fell from 5.25 percent August 2007 to just 2 
percent in mid 2008, have become the crucial determinants of the huge accumulation of 
official exchange reserves in China—Table 1, Figure 7, and Figure 8. Despite massive 12 
sterilization efforts by the PBC to prevent the monetary base from exploding, inflation 
could not be fully contained.  
 































Source: IMF, Peoples Bank of China. 
 
 
Figure 9 shows that consumer price inflation in China increased in 2004 with low U.S. 
interest rates, but then fell in 2005-06 when U.S interest rates rose so as to reduce capital 
inflows into China. However, after August 2007 when U.S. interest rates started to 
decline again, the inflationary outlook for China and the world changed dramatically. 
Official reserve accumulation further accelerated, raw material and food prices soared, 
and monetary growth in China became increasingly difficult to contain by various 
sterilization measures. By May 2008, Chinese consumer price inflation had climbed 
above 8% (Figure 9).  
 13 


























Source: IMF, SAFE. 2007 approximated. 
 
With domestic consumer prices rising, Chinese wage increases are putting additional 
upward pressure on the international dollar prices for Chinese manufactures. By 2007-08, 
China had been transformed from being a deflationary force on the world economy into 
an inflationary one. The combination of internal inflation and an appreciating renminbi is 
now raising the dollar prices of Chinese manufactured goods shipped to the United 
States. Before 2007, Figure 10 shows the (slightly) falling dollar prices of goods 
imported from China that helped to keep U.S. and world inflation surprisingly low for 
some years—sometimes known as the “great moderation”. By 2007-08, however, the 
figure shows the dollar prices of Chinese goods shipped to the U.S. spiking upward. 
Combined with loose monetary policy in the United States, the center country under the 


































Source: Ecowin Database.  
 
True, even without internal inflation, China’s rapid growth could well have bid up 
the prices of primary products—food, oil, and industrial raw materials. However, the loss 
of monetary control in “peripheral” economies—not only in China but in other emerging 
markets— accentuates the demand for primary products. As in the 1970s, behind this 
worldwide inflationary pressure is (was) unduly loose monetary policy by the United 
States coupled with American attempts to devalue the dollar for mercantilist reasons. The 
resulting capital flight from the United States leads emerging markets into overly 
expansionary monetary policies as they try to resist appreciation of their individual 
currencies (Swoboda 1978, McKinnon 1981, Hoffman and Schnabl forthcoming). 
However, the collective effect is undue monetary expansion in the world as a whole
3 with 
inflation that eventually rebounds back on the United States itself. 
                                                            
3 Notice that when Alexander Swoboda was writing about the dollar’s standard’s inflationary transmission 
mechanism in the late 1970s, the important “peripheral” countries forced into undue monetary expansion 
were in Western Europe and Japan. But now the strong euro system has curbed European monetary 
expansion and Japan is mired in a near-zero interest rate liquidity trap. So the main avenues of excess 
“world” money creation are in individual Asian countries outside of Japan. 15 






















Source: Ecowin Database. 
 
3. Overcoming Three Misconceptions about Currency Stabilization  
Because China’s current monetary and exchange rate impasse—with its one-way bet in 
the foreign exchange markets—is overheating its economy with unwanted inflation, its 
government is inhibited from taking appropriate actions to reduce its ballooning net trade 
(saving) surplus. Obvious steps for reducing “excess” net saving— such as cutting taxes 
and increasing government social expenditures would have a near-term inflationary 
impact. Less obvious is the impact on net saving of forcing (or encouraging) much higher 
dividend payouts from China’s corporate sector; but, under certain conditions, that too 
could be expansionary. 
Meanwhile, China’s current account surplus, uncovered by outflows of private 
capital, continually worsens the monetary impasse. Figure 11 shows the recent “frenzied” 
build up of exchange reserves so far in 2008 reaching US$100 billion per month, which is 
much higher than the monthly trade surplus. Because foreigners misinterpret the trade 16 
surplus and accumulating official exchange reserves to be evidence of an undervalued 
currency, they call for further appreciation of the renminbi. This foreign pressure 
strengthens the expectation that the renmimbi will be higher in the future, thus causing 
more inflows of hot money. 
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Source: IMF. Black and white areas indicate overall per month reserve accumulation. 
White areas indicate the Chinese monthly trade balance.  
 
What is the best way to escape from this conundrum? China can’t end its exchange rate 
impasse, and the worldwide monetary turmoil that goes with it, on its own. With proper 
foreign cooperation, however, the monetary impasse from the one-way bet in the foreign 
exchange markets could be resolved rather quickly. Thus, currency stabilization should 
precede measures to correct the saving-investment imbalance—which may take months 
or years to be effective both in China and abroad.  
Nevertheless, to be successful, the political economy of any international 
agreement likely requires both as a package deal. China bashing to get the renminbi up 
can only be stopped if China proposes definite fiscal measures to reduce its future saving 17 
surpluses—possibly in conjunction with U.S. efforts to reduce America’s saving 
deficiency, and overly loose domestic monetary policy leading to a weak dollar. 
Populist politics aside, what inhibits China and the United States (representing the 
interests of the industrial economies more generally) from agreeing on such a package 
deal that would be of such great mutual benefit? Three common misconceptions in 
economic theory on the role of the exchange rate inhibit any political agreement to 
stabilize China’s currency. Let us consider each in turn 
 
Misconception #1: The exchange rate can affect the trade balance.  
Many, if not most, economists believe that a country’s net trade balance can be controlled 
by manipulating the level of its exchange rate. However, a current account surplus 
(dominated by a trade surplus) just reflects a surplus of saving over investment at home—
and the converse abroad. Thus, how a discrete appreciation of a creditor country’s 
currency will eliminate its saving surplus is neither obvious nor unambiguous. True, its 
goods would become more expensive to foreigners—the relative price effect. But, in an 
economy open to international capital flows, domestic investment would fall because 
appreciation makes the country a more expensive place in which to produce. Also, 
because China owns huge stocks of foreign currency claims (largely dollars), a negative 
wealth effect from having the dollar fall against the renminbi would further reduce 
domestic expenditures—including for imports. This decline in imports offsets the 
dampening effect of higher foreign currency prices for exports so as to leave any change 
in the net trade balance small and ambiguous (Qiao 2007).  
To illustrate this exchange rate—trade balance misconception, it is instructive to 
revisit the consequences of Japan bashing to get the yen up more than three decades 
earlier starting with the Nixon shock of August 1971. The yen rose episodically from 360 
to the dollar in early 1971 to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. “Despite” this 
enormous cumulative appreciation, Japan’s net trade surplus rose from being negligible 
in the 1960s to average about 2 percent of GDP in the 1970s, peaked out at about 5 
percent in the late 1980s, and remains close to four percent of GDP in 2008 with the yen 
at 100-110 to the dollar. Massive currency fluctuations had no systematic impact on 
Japan’s net trade (saving) balance.  18 
However, the great nominal appreciations of the yen against the dollar, which 
Japan more or less welcomed during the worldwide inflation of the 1970s, eventually 
unhinged Japan’s macro economy (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). In the late 1980s, the 
syndrome of the ever-higher yen provoked bubbles in Japan’s stock and land markets 
along with a falling WPI (Hoffmann and Schnabl forthcoming). When the bubbles broke 
in 1990-91 followed by a further sharp rise in the yen in 1994-95, Japan was thrown into 
deflationary slump: its infamous “lost decade” of 1992 to 2002. Foreign exchange risk 
created (and still sustains) a near zero interest liquidity trap that renders monetary policy 
virtually impotent for stimulating domestic spending. (Goyal and McKinnon, 2003). 
Although Japan has had modest export-led GDP annual growth of 2 to 3 percent since 
2002, a deflationary hangover continues: wages and per capita consumption are stagnant 
(McKinnon, 2007b).   
 
Misconception #2. Ongoing exchange rate appreciation reduces inflation 
The second, but more subtle, misconception is that ongoing exchange appreciation can 
reduce domestic price inflation—or, at the very least, insulate the economy from 
international inflation. China gets much gratuitous advice to appreciate faster in order to 
“fight inflation”. This admonition is certainly true in the long run, as Japan’s unfortunate 
experience with eventual deflation from yen appreciation attests. However, for a country 
emerging from a fixed nominal exchange rate where domestic and foreign rates of price 
inflation had been more or less aligned, the near-term effect of a well-telegraphed 
transition to an appreciating currency can be highly inflationary—as with China’s current 
monetary impasse. In the near-term transition, the inflationary impact from the loss of 
monetary control can overwhelm the deflationary impact of a higher level of the 
exchange rate.  
Again, let us refer to Japan’s earlier experience with this transition problem. 
Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate parities, the yen had been 
successfully fixed at 360 to the dollar from 1949 to August 1971, so that price inflation in 
tradable goods (WPI) between the U.S. and Japan were similar. As early as 1970, 
however, market participants began to project that the dollar might be depreciated. Hot 
money began to flow out of the United States into European countries as well as Japan 19 
(despite its capital controls). In order to prevent more precipitate appreciation, in 1971-72 
the Bank of Japan intervened heavily in the foreign exchange markets with a rapid 
buildup of foreign exchange reserves and surge in domestic money growth. By 1974, 
annualized WPI inflation in Japan became higher than in the United States: 31.3 percent 
versus “just” 18.9 percent in the U.S. Only in the late 1970s did Japanese inflation fall 
below American—the “long run” relative deflationary effect of a higher yen that most 
economists expect. But the length and strength of the near term inflationary transition 
was surprising. China is still in the inflationary “near-term” which, with no change in 
present circumstances of arm twisting to get the renminbi up, could continue for an 
uncomfortably long time. 
  Are there circumstances where China should acquiesce to continual reminbi 
appreciation? Clearly if the center country under the world dollar standard continues to 
inflate too much, the People’s Bank of China would have little choice but to acquiesce to 
a managed ongoing appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. However, the current 
rate of appreciation is too rapid for securing either near-term monetary control in China 
or long-term price-level alignment with the United States. 
 
Misconception # 3. Floating the rate would equilibrate the foreign exchange market. 
“Flexibility” is a nicer word than floating. Couldn’t the PBC simply withdraw from the 
foreign exchange market and let the exchange rate be determined by private market 
makers—much in the way that the euro’s value against the dollar is determined? No, 
because this proposed solution presumes that a determinate market exchange rate— 
which could balance the demand and supply of dollars in terms of renminbi—actually 
exists if the PBC were to exit the market. Unlike the Europe-United States situation, 
however, China faces an ongoing currency mismatch leading to the syndrome of   
“conflicted virtue” (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004, and McKinnon 2005) that prevents 
private market makers from clearing the excess supply of dollars.  
What causes the mismatch that undermines the case for floating? The renminbi, 
like the currencies of other developing economies, is not used significantly for 
international borrowing or lending; but China couples this gap in its capital markets with 
an enormous saving (trade) surplus. Thus dollar, rather than renminbi, claims on 20 
foreigners continually pile up within the economy. (The dollar is the “default” 
international money.) Natural private market makers such as Chinese banks—or even 
insurance companies and pension funds—all have their liabilities to depositors, policy 
holders, and so forth, denominated in renminbi. Thus, even if the yuan/dollar rate 
fluctuated only randomly, Chinese financial institutions would be exposed to too much 
exchange risk (relative to their limited capital) to allow dollar assets continually to pile up 
on their balance sheets. At some point, they would stop buying new dollar claims 
associated with the ongoing trade surplus. Consequently, a free float would result in an 
indefinite upward spiral of the renminbi against the dollar—with no well-defined balance 
point where Chinese financial institutions become sufficiently willing buyers of dollar 
assets to stop their further depreciation.  
This third misconception is linked to the first. A floating but appreciating 
renminbi would not predictably reduce China’s trade surplus, and dollars would continue 
to pour into the economy. On the other hand, if China was not a creditor country because 
foreign trade (net saving) was close to being balanced, then no substantial internal 
currency mismatch would exist and an uneasy float could be possible
4. 
However, the issue is somewhat broader. Suppose China did not have a chronic 
saving surplus, but its bond markets were still not well developed at different terms to 
maturity, and there were residual capital controls (as in most developing economies). 
Then forward markets for private hedging against currency risk becomes difficult to 
organize and expensive. So, willy nilly, if the government attempted to float the rate, it 
would soon be drawn back to smooth exchange fluctuations—if only at higher 
frequencies—in order to reduce the risks seen by exporters and importers. This “fear of 
floating” is well documented by Carmen Reinhart and Guillermo Calvo (2000 and 2002). 
 
                                                            
4 The non feasibility of a pure float applies symmetrically to a chronic debtor economy whose debts are 
denominated in foreign currencies, say dollars, that continue to pile up from ongoing trade deficits. Again 
there is an internal currency mismatch where domestic foreign currency debtors are threatened with 
bankruptcy should the domestic currency depreciate—and the threat thereof could easily precipitate a run 
out of the domestic currency. This was the case in the great Asian crisis of 1997-98 as the five countries 
involved had run trade deficits for several years and built up large (private) dollar debts.  21 
4. Toward a Credibly Fixed Exchange Rate 
Overcoming these three misconceptions about the exchange rate is crucial for stabilizing 
China’s monetary system. For a developing country like China on the periphery of the 
dollar standard, the exchange rate is best considered just an extension of domestic 
monetary policy—and not an instrument of trade policy. This monetary approach to the 
exchange rate suggests that China should reset the yuan/dollar exchange rate and adjust 
domestic monetary policy through time to keep it stable, as was the case between 1995 
and 2004, i.e., phase 2 in Figure 2.  
What should this new rate be? The precise level of the new rate is much less 
important than having it credibly stable into the indefinite future. However, with the 
unfortunate recent history of bashing China to get the rate up, an international 
understanding or more formal agreement to end China bashing is now necessary for any 
new fix to be sufficiently credible to eliminate the one-way bet on future renminbi 
appreciation. If such an agreement were forthcoming “today” (mid-2008), the PBC 
should simply pick today’s rate of 6.8 yuan per dollar as the central rate—within the 
conventional narrow band of ±0.3 percent—to be continued forward.  
Ending China bashing through a political agreement is not as far fetched as it 
might first seem. After almost 25 years of Japan bashing to get the yen up, in April 1995 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin announced a new “strong dollar policy”, and Japan 
bashing ceased. The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of Japan then intervened 
jointly several times in the summer of 1995 to quash any further appreciations of the yen. 
Although this strong dollar policy saved Japan from further deflationary ruin, it was just a 
ceiling on the yen and not a stable fix. Subsequent large fluctuations in the yen/dollar 
rate, when domestic holdings of dollar assets from Japan’s being an international creditor 
are large, have destabilized the Japanese financial system and tightened its low interest 
rate liquidity trap. But this interest rate story is a digression for another time (McKinnon 
2007b). 
In the Chinese case, it would be sufficient to stabilize the renminbi if foreign 
pressure to appreciate ceased. Then the PBC itself could reset the yuan/dollar rate so as to 
eliminate the one way bet on ongoing appreciation. A massive outflow of private capital 
largely intermediated by Chinese banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and so 22 
forth, would surely follow as these institutions would be more than happy to diversify 
into foreign assets once the one-way bet was eliminated. With normal private sector 
financial international intermediation for China’s huge current account surplus, the PBC 
could stop purchasing dollar assets on a large scale. Indeed, if the new capital outflow 
exceeded the current account surplus, the PBC might have to sell some of China’s 
absurdly high dollar reserves to keep the renminbi fixed against the dollar at the newly 
reset rate. In any event, the PBC could regain control over the domestic money supply 
while reducing reserve requirements on domestic banks. Inflation would come down and 
the efficiency of domestic financial intermediation would improve. The credit crunch in 
U.S. financial markets would be eased as private capital flowed back to the United States.  
Finally, once its domestic monetary and exchange rate system was stabilized, 
China could then proceed deliberately to reduce excess domestic saving relative to its 
huge domestic investment without worrying about exacerbating near-term inflation. But 
to analyze desirable long-term changes in China’s tax, spending, and dividend policies 
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